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the Supreme Court in Tafflin determined that state courts are fully competent to handle the complexities of RICO claims, particularly because many
RICO claims involve alleged violations of state law. Moreover, the Supreme
Court found that although RICO provided procedural mechanisms applicable only in federal court, the existance of procedural mechanisms did not
in itself create a clear incompatibility of state jurisdiction with federal
interests. Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Tafflin v. Levitt held that
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims. As a result,
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Fourth Circuit.
BANKRUPTCY

In Burd v. Walters, 868 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1989), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered, first, whether a
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to review attorney's fees, and second,
whether a bankruptcy court has power to impose sanctions for civil contempt. In Burd Homer G. Walters and Evolene Walters filed a bankruptcy
petition under Chapter 13. After the Walters filed for bankruptcy, BancOhio
(the Bank), one of the Walters' larger creditors, instituted a proceeding to
contest the discharge of the Bank's claims against the Walters. The Walters
responded by engaging Burd, an attorney, to file several business tort
actions against the Bank. Eventually, however, the Bank agreed to withdraw
from bankruptcy court and to settle all of the Bank's disputes with the
Walters, including the tort actions that Burd filed.
On February 22, 1984, the bankruptcy court considered the reasonableness of Burd's fee agreement with the Walters. The bankruptcy court then
directed the Walters to establish a pool in the amount of $40,000 from
which the Walters would pay any legal fees the court found were reasonable.
Six days later, Burd instructed the Walters to give him a check for $59,191.96.
Burd alleged that the $59,191.96 represented the legal fees due Burd and
two other attorneys connected with the tort actions against the Bank.
Although the bankruptcy court had not approved the disbursement, the
Walters gave Burd a $59,191.96 check. Burd's share of the Walters' $59,191.96
check was $29,000.00. On September 28, 1984, the bankruptcy court ordered
Burd to return $14,000 of Burd's $29,000 fee. Burd failed to return the
$14,000, and on December 26, 1984, the bankruptcy judge ordered Burd to
appear and show cause why the court should not find Burd in contempt
for failing to return the $14,000 as ordered. On January 14, 1985, Burd
sent his attorney to appear and present the bankruptcy court with a check
for $14,000 and an order requiring the clerk to hold the funds pending an
appeal. The bankruptcy court refused to hold the check longer than twentyone days. Consequently, Burd's attorney withdrew the check and the order.
Forty-three days later, on February 26, 1985, neither having received a stay
from the district court nor having heard from Burd or Burd's attorney, the
bankruptcy court entered an order holding Burd in civil contempt. Burd
appealed to the United States District Court for the District of West Virginia,
and the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order. Burd appealed
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the district court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Burd raised several issues. First, Burd
contended that the bankruptcy court did not have the power to review
Burd's fees because Burd provided his services in a matter unrelated to the
Walters' bankruptcy. To resolve the issue, the Fourth Circuit cited Bankruptcy Rule 2017(b) and 11 U.S.C. section 329 (1988), both of which
provide that a bankruptcy court may review an attorney's fees if the fees
in any way are related to the bankruptcy case. The Fourth Circuit observed
that Burd brought the tort actions on the Walters' behalf to pressure the
Bank into withdrawing from the Bank's position in bankruptcy court.
Accordingly, the court held that Burd's services sufficiently were related to
the bankruptcy proceeding to support the bankruptcy judge's review of
Burd's fees. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit rejected Burd's second argument
that the bankruptcy court had no power to review Burd's fees because the
Walters had paid Burd with exempt funds. The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that under 11 U.S.C. section 329 (1988), a bankruptcy court may review
any payment to the attorney of a debtor. Accordingly, in Burd the Fourth
Circuit held that Burd's fees were subject to the bankruptcy court's review.
Having found that the bankruptcy court had the authority to review
Burd's legal fees, the Fourth Circuit considered Burd's third argument.
Burd challenged the bankruptcy court's finding that Burd's conduct constituted civil contempt. Burd asserted that he had been willing to perform
and, therefore, that the contempt finding was improper. The Fourth Circuit
rejected Burd's argument and explained that civil contempt, as opposed to
criminal contempt, does not require that a court find an intent not to
comply with an order. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court properly could hold Burd in civil contempt despite Burd's
willingness to perform. Burd also argued that the contempt finding was
erroneous because Burd's attorney, and not Burd, failed to comply with
the bankruptcy court's order. The Fourth Circuit construed Burd's argument
that his attorney was at fault as amounting to a defense of advice of
counsel. In rejecting Burd's argument, the court again distinguished civil
and criminal contempt. The Fourth Circuit explained that advice of counsel
may be a viable defense in a criminal contempt proceeding because advice
of counsel may negate the element of willfulness. The Fourth Circuit,
however, determined that, because civil contempt does not require willfulness, the negation of willfulness based on advice of counsel is no defense
to civil contempt. Instead, the court in Burd relied on prior case law to
determine that in civil contempt cases one may not choose an attorney and
then escape responsibility for the attorney's acts or omissions. Accordingly,
the Fourth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court's contempt finding was
proper.
Having affirmed the propriety of the bankruptcy court's contempt order,
the Fourth Circuit considered Burd's argument that the bankruptcy court
lacked the power to hold Burd in contempt. Burd contended that no
statutory authority existed for a bankruptcy court's exercise of contempt
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power. Burd further contended that, if statutory authority existed for a
bankruptcy court's exercise of contempt power, such authority would constitute an unconstitutional grant of article III power to an article I court.
The Fourth Circuit found that 11 U.S.C. section 105(a) (1988) grants
bankruptcy judges the authority to issue any order, process, or judgment
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code. The court determined that the contempt order was appropriate in
carrying out the administration of the Walters' estate and, therefore, that
the statute authorized the bankruptcy court's contempt order. The Fourth
Circuit noted that the Ninth Circuit had reached the opposite conclusion
based on the Ninth Circuit's determination that Congress would not have
conferred unrestricted contempt power on bankruptcy courts. Nevertheless,
the Fourth Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis and relied instead
on what the Fourth Circuit perceived to be the statute's plain meaning.
After rejecting Burd's contention that no statutory authority existed for
a bankruptcy court's exercise of contempt power, the Fourth Circuit considered Burd's contention that such statutory authority is unconstitutional.
Burd argued that the exercise of contempt power fundamentally is so judicial
in nature that Congress may not delegate contempt power to an article I
court without violating the constitutional principle of separation of powers.
Burd's argument that statutory authority for the bankruptcy court's exercise
of contempt power was unconstitutional was based on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
The Fourth Circuit noted that Northern Pipeline, although not directly
on point, was persuasive on the constitutional issue raised in Burd. The
Northern Pipeline Court found a federal statute unconstitutional because
the statute empowered an article I court to decide state law rights and issues
that only an article III court may decide. In Burd, however, the right at
issue was a federal right-the right of a debtor to have his affairs wound
up in bankruptcy court. The Fourth Circuit noted that Congress has the
power to create and define federal rights. Based upon language in the
plurality opinion of Northern Pipeline, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
the power of Congress to require individuals seeking to vindicate federal
rights to appear in a particular forum is incidental to Congress's power to
create and define federal rights. Based on the Supreme Court's holding in
Northern Pipeline, the Fourth Circuit found that the bankruptcy court's
contempt power is incidental to Congress's power to define a federal right
and that, therefore, the bankruptcy court's exercise of contempt power was
constitutional.
After rejecting Burd's constitutional argument, the Fourth Circuit considered Burd's final contention that the sanctions which the bankruptcy
court imposed were improper. The bankruptcy court's order required that
Burd reimburse the Walters for lost interest, for additional expenses incurred
in enforcing the Walters' rights, for additional attorney's fees that Burd's
contempt caused, and for emotional distress. In Burd the Fourth Circuit
held that the bankruptcy court's damage award was proper except for the
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award for emotional distress. The court vacated the emotional distress
award because no authority existed for the proposition that emotional
distress is a proper element of damages for civil contempt. Accordingly,
the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision on damages for
emotional distress and affirmed the district court's judgment in all other
respects.
In Combs v. Richardson, 838 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1988), the Fourth
Circuit considered whether a bankruptcy court may preclude a debtor from
relitigating the issue of whether the debtor willfully and maliciously has
injured a judgment creditor. Fred Combs filed for bankruptcy in 1983. In
1984 a federal civil jury found that Combs willfully and maliciously attacked
Alvin Richardson in 1979 and awarded Richardson $3700 in compensatory
damages and $1300 in punitive damages. Richardson, attempting to have
the tort judgment debt declared nondischargeable, subsequently filed a
complaint in Combs's bankruptcy proceeding.
In the bankruptcy proceeding, Richardson argued that the bankruptcy
court should find the tort judgment nondischargeable under section 523 of
the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. section 523 (1988), which provides that a
bankruptcy court should not discharge a judgment debt if the judgment
debtor willfully and maliciously has injured the judgment creditor. Richardson next argued that the bankruptcy court should preclude Combs from
relitigating the issue of whether Combs willfully and maliciously injured
Richardson because a federal civil jury already had found that Combs
willfully and maliciously injured Richardson. The bankruptcy court initially
rejected the latter argument but subsequently reconsidered and found the
jury verdict in the tort action to constitute sufficient evidence of Combs'
willful and malicious conduct towards Richardson. Consequently, the bankruptcy court collaterally estopped Combs from relitigating the issue of
whether Combs willfully and maliciously injured Richardson and declared
the judgment debt nondischargeable. The United States District Court for
the Western District of Virginia affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision.
Combs appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that the bankruptcy
court and the district court improperly precluded litigation of the willful
and malicious injury question. The Fourth Circuit began its discussion of
the case by reviewing the principles of collateral estoppel as applied to
bankruptcy proceedings. According to the Fourth Circuit, the parties in the
first action actually must litigate an issue to avoid relitigation, and the
disposition of the issue in the first action must be necessary to the judgment
before preclusion can apply in a bankruptcy proceeding. Following the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979), the
Fourth Circuit stated that a bankruptcy court may preclude a judgment
debtor from relitigating the issue of whether the debtor willfully and
maliciously injured the judgment creditor so long as the litigation of the
issue was necessary to the judgment in the previous action.
The Fourth Circuit next addressed Combs's argument that the bankruptcy court and the district court failed to recognize that the willful and

